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Abstract
Since the 1980s empirical research has been conducted on the in-
fluence of MNEs on local firms. The spillovers predicted by growth
theory models used in the research designs have not been found. The
main result is the importance of increased competition for the produc-
tivity of local firms. When FDI flows expanded rapidly in the 1990s, it
became clear that MNEs play an important role in international tech-
nology transfer. However, growth theory models are limited in that
market structures and firms cannot be modeled explicitly. The New
Economic Geography (NEG) is better equipped to handle these issues.
Instead of spillovers it relies on linkages. Therefore, new insights might
be gained by basing empirical research on a NEG model and looking
for linkages among firms.
∗Uhlhornsweg A5-0-009, 26129 Oldenburg, Germany, dirk@ehnts.de
1 Introduction
Since the days of Adam Smith economists have sought to explain economic
growth and all the questions that come with it: Why are some regions grow-
ing faster than others? Why are regions sometimes growing fast, then not
growing at all (or even shrinking)? Why do regions at one point ’outgrow’
their neighbors, later they lag behind only to catch up again1?
Growth and underdevelopment has been a big issue before. After World
War II economists tackled the problems of what became known as develop-
ment economics. Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) called for a government-initiated
’Big Push’ to get countries growing. Hirschman postulated his ideas about
unbalanced growth. Capital should be invested in leading sectors, he reck-
oned, so that growth in these sectors would be beneficial for other sectors of
the economy due to input/output relations of firms - ’linkages’. Hirschman
was thereby the first to employ the term ’linkage’ in this context2. Foreign
capital was necessary to achieve this growth, but the resulting higher growth
path would be sufficient to pay off the initial debt. Chenery (1960) tried to
find patterns of growth while Rostow (1960) described the process of indus-
trialization by countries going through ’stages of growth’. These ideas were
not formalized into mathematic models but nevertheless (or maybe there-
fore?) greatly influenced people working in governments and international
organizations. When Latin American nations followed these ideas by bor-
rowing heavily, aided by international organizations like the IMF and the
World Bank, they finally achieved the ’Big Push’, but in the wrong direc-
tion: indebted and growth less some countries of Latin America tumbled
through ’the lost decade’ of the 1980s.
The neo-classical growth theory meanwhile started as a tool to study
macro-economic stability in a Keynesian context3. It became obvious that
the outcome of the Harrod-Domar model (Harrod, 1939 and Domar, 1946)
would be a constant rate of growth, which only coincidentally happened
to be the growth rate necessary to supply a growing work force with jobs.
Solow (1956) predicted that the growth rates of developed and developing
countries would tend to converge, given that the available technology would
be the same. In 1986 Romer revived the subject with his seminal paper ’En-
dogenous Technical Change’. He states that not only physical capital can
be accumulated, but also other types of reproducible capital, like knowl-
edge. Knowledge can be understood as the ’product’ of a research sector,
whose production function shows increasing returns to scale in respect to
knowledge. Romer also introduces externalities as knowledge spillovers.
The predictions of the (endogenous) growth theory were the subject of
1See Brakman et al. (2001)
2The Idea of firms gaining in competitiveness by forming a cluster was first brought
up by Weber (1909)
3van de Klundert and Smulders (2001)
2
an empirical literature. Blomstro¨m and others tried to find the predicted
knowledge spillovers. The search was mainly taking place in developing
countries such as Mexico, Indonesia and Morocco. Data was adjusted to
a fit an AK model. Researchers hoped to find that productivity growth
would be significantly higher in industries with a large foreign share, com-
pared to those dominated by national firms. The results were disappointing.
Spillovers were not found.
Finally, the New Economic Geography4 deals (indirectly) with growth.
Merging core-periphery spatial patterns with Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) competi-
tion and Samuelson’s iceberg costs (1954) proved to be a powerful combi-
nation (Krugman, 1991). While this work was written as an extension of
the new trade theory5, the model can give answers for most of the questions
about growth posed at the beginning of this paper.
In the following I will argue that the growth theory is not well suited to
model MNEs and their effect on local firms. The main reason is that neither
firms nor market structure (and with it the degree of competition) can be
explicitly modeled by growth theory. The role of knowledge spillovers as the
vehicle of technology transfer differs from what is offered by recent research.
NEG models build on local linkages among firms. The different concepts
of growth theory and NEG are likely to influence the results of empirical
research. While the search for spillovers using a growth theory setup has
failed to turn up supporting evidence, it might be useful to try a NEG model
instead and look for linkages.
The next section deals with links between FDI and growth via tech-
nology transfer. Spillovers and linkages are characterized and categorized.
This is followed by a description of the part FDI plays in growth theory. In
Section 4 follows an assessment of the empirical research regarding growth
through FDI. Section 5 deals with the New Economic Geography more com-
prehensively so that in section 6 this theory can be confronted with spillover
concepts and the empirical results from section 4. Section 7 concludes this
paper.
2 FDI - Engine of Growth
The relationship of inward FDI and Growth is a close one. As can be
seen in Graph 1, there is a correlation between the two. It seems that
whenever growth of the world economy takes a dive, FDI contracts in the
following period. Take 1982 or 1991, for instance. Growth slows down to
a multi-year-low, with FDI flows shrinking. What does that say about the
relationship between growth and FDI? It seems that growth and FDI go
4For a short introduction see Krugman (1998)
5And probably meant to find answers on the question of regions diverging or converging
in times of ongoing integration on a global and regional (EU, NAFTA) level
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together, with FDI depending on growth and lagging behind a bit. One
could follow Schumpeter6 and argue that a growing economy is producing
new/better products and technologies. These can be built elsewhere to
make a good profit. One way to reap these profits would be FDI (the other
important one being trade).
2.1 Overall effects of FDI
While there is no doubt that ’traditional’ direct effects of investment will
occur - like rising employment, rising output, rising taxes - doubt has been
cast over the net effects. Some argue that the arrival of MNEs harms domes-
tic firms by stealing their market shares and destroying their profitability.
So after accounting for these effects, the welfare effects on the host country
would remain unclear. The question at hand is: What is the effect of FDI
on local firms in the host economy?
Fig. 1: Growth rates of world FDI flows and GDP, 1980-2002 (per cent)
Very similar to this question has been the discussion about gains from
trade. Trade and FDI seem to be complementary. Two types of FDI can
be identified. Horizontal FDI are investments in firms of the same industry.
They form the biggest part of Mergers and Acquisitions. Vertical FDI are
investments in vertically linked industries. That may be a greenfield invest-
ment or a joint venture. Often the goal is to enhance the supply chain. This
inevitably leads to fragmentation of the global economy.
Whatever form FDI takes, it is quite likely that foreign products (which
embody foreign technology) are sold on the market of the host economy,
hurting local competitors in the process. The profits gained by the MNE
6See Schumpeter (1942), Part II, Chapter VII: The Process of Creative Destruction
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are often expatriated, to some extent. Trade theory tells us that there are
winners and losers in trade. Consumers get new/improved products and
therefore are better off, while some firms face tougher competition in their
respective markets, seeing profits decline. Still, countries are supposed to
gain from trade because of higher overall efficiency in their economies. If
there is no big difference between trade and FDI, why then is the discussion
of gains from FDI so different from the one we had about trade?
While with trade firms are spatially separated, multinationals arriving
in host economies are neighbors with local firms. Therefore, they are part
of an agglomeration, given that they are not isolated from the rest of the
economy7.
2.2 Linkages and Spillovers
According to the growth theory international knowledge spillovers are a re-
sult of international economic integration. Therefore, arriving MNEs will
boost the transmission of spillovers to local firms. In other words: The host
economy will benefit from inward FDI. Empirical researchers might want to
single out spillover channels. Hopefully, data would be available for one or
more of the suspected spillover channels.
Channel How does it work?
labor exchange workers move from MNE to local firms
learning effect local firms learn from MNEs (linkage exists)
demonstration effect local firms copy MNEs processes
competition effect outcome depends on market structure
Table 1: Spillover Channels between local firms and MNE8
As it turns out, none of the spillover channels seem to be very measur-
able. When knowledge is transferred, there is not much ’noise’ in the real
world. Labor exchange, learning and demonstration effects also might take
time to happen. A certain time lag would then blur the results, causing
a delay between cause and effect. Only the competition effect would be
instant, but nonetheless difficult to measure.
The concept of spillovers was developed by Marshall (1890)9 who sought
to explain the concentration of industries in particular locations. He found
that an agglomeration of firms is more attractive for workers, as the higher
supply of jobs raises the probability of finding a job. In the literature this
7Like being located in an export processing zone
8I do not differentiate between ’Knowledge’ and ’Technological’ Spillovers, because
there is hardly any difference. Take the learning effect: the local firm could gain knowledge
or technology. The effect in terms of increased productivity will probably be the same.
9Book IV, Chapter 10, ’Industrial Organization Continued. The Concentration of
Specialized Industries in Particular Localities’
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phenomenon is known as labor pooling. Another spillover is the spread of
ideas. If a firm invents a new product, neighboring firms might feel inclined
develop similar products. In the following table the effects that Marshall
described are covered:
Spillover effect for firms EGT NEG
Labor Pooling positive not featured not featured
Price Index positive not featured featured
Demonstration unclear featured not featured
Learning unclear featured not featured
Congestion negative not featured featured
Competition unclear not featured featured
Table 2: Types of spillovers10
The competition effect according to Marshall was a supply-side kind effect:
Industries fought for inputs. When inputs were in strong demand, their
prices rose. Today the competition effect is understood as the demand-side
competition of firms for customers. It depends on market structure - in a
competitive environment the entry of a MNE is more likely to increase pro-
ductivity then in an oligopolistic situation. Marshall’s competition effect
is embodied in today’s idea of ’congestion’. Copying or imitating a MNE
is causing the demonstration and learning effects. Local firms are likely to
benefit while the MNE might give away part of its tacit knowledge. The
price index effect consists of sinking input prices as more and more firms are
producing at the same location. The argument rests on sinking transport
costs and exploiting economies of scale.
Spillovers are a part of the theory of public goods, where they are
called externalities. Main criteria for spillovers are non-excludability and
non-rivalrous consumption. This is where the differences of linkages and
spillovers become apparent: while spillovers are not influenced by the emit-
ter, linkages absolutely are11. A linkage arises only if an arriving firm inter-
acts with a local firm. Contracting a local supplier, for instance, represents
a linkage. Therefore, constructing a linkage demands action on both sides,
MNE and local firm. Linkages consist of contracts, which indicates that
transaction costs might play an important role.
There are two types of linkages: forward linkages and backward link-
ages. A forward linkage is a supply-related effect: The production in sector
Y might induce firms in sector Z, which use Y as an input, to expand produc-
tion. An arriving multinational setting up shop in the Y sector will produce
10Results taken from Ehnts (2002), EGT = Endogenous Growth Theory, NEG = New
Economic Geography
11According to Wang and Blomstro¨m (1992) spillovers can be suppressed by firms, and
receiving spillovers can induce learning costs on the local firm, too.
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either a new variety of good Y or an existing variety, which tends to lower
its price. Firms that use sector Y goods as inputs will now find themselves
better off: either they pay a lower price for their inputs or they have the
chance to incorporate a new variety. This improves their utility if consumers
value variety in inputs. The backward-linkage is demand-related, as the ad-
dition of a firm of sector Y raises demand of their inputs, say goods of sector
X. This might increase output per firm or promote the entry of new firms.
Hirschman thought that by increasing demand, economies of scale could be
exploited. These ideas were taken up again by the NEG, which I will discuss
later on.
A backward linkage might feature a MNE helping its suppliers to raise
their productivity or product quality. Lipsey (2002) found that MNEs show
domestic firms how to fit into worldwide production networks. While the
intended transfer of knowledge of the MNE to a local firm would be a link-
age, an unintended transfer would be a spillover. It is important to be clear
about the concepts of spillovers and linkages. The empirical literature dis-
cussed below is built around the concept of (knowledge or technological)
spillovers, while the New Economic Geography emphasizes the role of link-
ages. When empirical results and theoretical concepts are compared further
on, the distinction between spillovers and linkages and its application will
be a topic again. Advancing chronologically, I will start with a description
of the empirical literature and the theories in the background.
3 FDI in a Growth Theory framework
The most relevant theoretical model, Romer (1986), is the endogenous growth
model. Romer used Arrow’s (1962) AK model as a starting point. The AK
model in its original form is quite simple. The new feature of the model was
that it did not yield diminishing returns. In its simplest form, that would
be
Y (t) = AK(t), (1)
with Y being output, A representing the level of technology, K human
capital, and t for time. Growth in the model is now endogenous because even
as technology stagnates (A¯ > 0) the accumulation of human capital leads
to a positive growth rate. To explicitly model knowledge-driven growth, it
is necessary to modify the production function so that we get
Y (t) = F (K(t), AL(t)), (2)
with K now representing physical capital and L human capital. So out-
put is a function of physical capital and the product of technological level
and human capital. According to Arrow (1962), two assumptions are made
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to introduce knowledge spillovers. First, learning-by-doing works through
investment. Empirically, the relationship between patents and investment
backs up this first assumption. The second assumption is not so undis-
puted: Knowledge is a public good. While the first condition of a (pure)
public good (non-rivalry) is fulfilled, there are problems with the concept
of non-excludability. Firms have incentives to keep their knowledge secret.
They might fear that other firms use their technology to enter the market
and outbid them. This would be a classic case of free-riding: The second
firm does not have to include investment in R&D in their pricing, so they
can offer lower prices. If new technology formerly was an entry barrier for
competitors, it has now turned into an invitation to enter the market and
drive down revenues. The usual way to counter this is to acquire a patent
of the technology invented.
Anyway, a model that would allow for knowledge spillovers would replace
the level of technology A with the world stock of knowledge, embodied in
the world physical capital Kω, resulting in
Y (t) = F (K(t),Kω(t)L(t)), (3)
An investment of a firm would result in two effects. First, the single firm
produces more efficiently because K rises and Kω enhances the productivity
of human capital. Second, all other firms produce more efficiently, because
the enhancement in labor productivity is not restricted to the single firm,
but beneficial to all other firms as well. This is the knowledge spillover.
If growth could be described like equation (2), the empirical search for
spillovers would be quite simple. One would try to find statistics to represent
Y , A, L, and K. For instance, Sjo¨holm (1999) defines Y as value added,
A as level of productivity, which is influenced by the level of FDI, L as
number of employees and K as total investment. A is then represented in
three different cases by (1) capital intensities in an industry, (2) patent fees
in an industry, and (3) difference in labor productivity between MNEs and
national firms.
To allow for competition spillovers, it is common to use the Herfindahl-
Index12 and the effective rate of protection (ERP). The ERP is used as a
measure of the degree of openness to foreign competition. I would call it
an ’index of uncompetitiveness’. The higher the index is, the more uncom-
petitive is the industry relative to the world market13. Thereby, industries
can be separated into groups with different market structures. Markets
can be competitive and open (Herfindahl-Index close to 0, ERP close to 0
or even negative), or uncompetitive and closed against foreign competition
(Herfindahl-Index close to 1, ERP much higher than 0). This brings us
12A measure for competition in an industry. It equals the sum of the squared relative
market shares of all companies in a market.
13See Corden (1966)
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straight to the empirical literature.
4 Empirical findings and their interpretation
4.1 Industry-level data and empirical findings
The empirical search for intra-industry spillovers through FDI began with
studies of Australia (Caves, 1974) and Canada (Globerman, 1979), followed
by Blomstro¨m and Persson (1983). These authors wanted to find out
whether differences in technical efficiencies of Mexican plants
in part derive from spillover efficiency associated with foreign
direct investment14.
Usually, an AK model was estimated and industry-level data used. Then the
industries’ productivity and productivity growth were estimated. It was as-
sumed that sectors with a relatively high foreign participation would feature
higher productivity and/or productivity growth rates because of ’productiv-
ity spillovers’. Finding higher productivity of local firms would signify an
one-time ’push’ from FDI, while a higher productivity growth rate would
point to a long-term effect.
Blomstro¨m and Persson (1983) chose Mexico for their research. Although
the authors did not explicitly mention it, proof of higher productivity in
industries with a high foreign share could have paved the way for a new
development strategy. The productivity increase would have been found
to be transmitted via spillovers between local and foreign firms. Economic
growth or catch-up could then be achieved by attracting MNEs, which today
is a standard strategy for many countries15. Certainly this conclusion was
not reached because the results did not support it.
The next point concerns the applied empirical setup. Blomstro¨m and
Persson (1983) state that the competition effect might be the most important
spillover channel. This finding was highlighted by following papers. Just like
trade, FDI increases competition16. The problem was that many researchers
tried to neutralize any effects on competition in their setups. They used the
Herfindahl-Index to isolate this effect from their findings, believing that they
would get rid of an error. But this error that they separated might have
been the most important part of the whole study.
The competition effect is easy to observe because it has a short time
lag. Entry of firms instantly raises competition, and sometimes even the
possibility of entry has this effect. The other spillover channels would have
a time lag that is measured in years. Workers switching from MNEs to local
14Blomstro¨m and Persson, 1983, p.493
15See Kumar (1998), Chapter 8
16If it does not result in a monopoly of the MNE, that is.
9
firms, adaption of local suppliers to MNEs needs, all this takes time. So the
standard growth theory setup has a time lag problem regarding spillovers.
Balasubramanyam, Salisu and Sapsford (1996), Sjo¨holm (1999) as well as
Kokko, Zejan and Tansini (2001) used similar theoretical foundations trying
to shed light on the effect of trade regimes (import/export-oriented, ERP)
on the existence of spillovers from MNEs. While evidence for the influence
of the trade regime on productivity spillovers was mixed, one fact was undis-
puted: Trade policy can change the incentives for MNEs. There are assumed
to be two types of FDI17. The first type is motivated by supply-conditions,
mostly cheap factors of production. Vertical production networks are a
prime example: Parts are produced at the cheapest location, then exported
to a destination next to a large market, where the parts are assembled and
the product is sold. For instance, a big German car maker gets its seat
fillings from Brazil. A supplier there uses coconut filling to produce seats.
The Brazilian firm’s seat fillings are cheaper than German products. The
product is then exported to Germany where it is delivered to the assembly
plants.
The second type of FDI is motivated by demand-conditions, mostly prox-
imity to large markets. This might explain why China accounts for such a
big part of global FDI inflows (See UNCTAD (2003), p. 8). Restrictions to
trade influence the attractiveness of the country for the two types of FDI.
While the introduction of trade barriers might even be attracting demand-
motivated FDI (by raising the relative costs of trade), supply-motivated FDI
will be harmed because of higher exporting costs.
4.2 Panel data on a firm-level and empirical findings
Haddad and Harrison (1993) criticized the use of aggregated data and sug-
gested to look at the firms one by one, thereby using panel data on a firm-
level. Total Factor Productivity (TFP) was selected as the main variable in
place of labor productivity. Labor productivity in foreign firms was found
to be only 70% compared to local firms (I pick up that point later). Maybe
that prompted Haddad and Harrison to switch to TFP instead. A high share
of foreign firms in a sector was assumed to be a reason for spillovers. How-
ever, no significant spillovers were found. It seems that the MNEs take over
considerable market share in the short run. This leads to under-utilization
of capacity at domestic-owned plants, which is lowering their TFP. Overall,
local firms’ growth rates outgrew those of foreign firms nonetheless, but this
was not found to depend on the share of foreign firms in the sector.
The results were confirmed by Aitken and Harrison (1999) for Venezuela.
FDI is found to harm the productivity of domestically owned plants. On
the other hand, joint ventures are likely to gain from FDI. This depends
17I do not stick to the words of the authors, but use a different set of vocabulary. That
way things are easier to compare in the next sections.
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on the share of foreign investment, though. In foreign-dominated sectors
the likeliness of spillovers from FDI to joint ventures increases. Aitken and
Harrison also deal with the question of FDI being cause or reason for high
productivity. They find that foreign investors choose higher than average
productive plants. This productivity bias would account for at least a part
of the higher productivity in industries with a high foreign share.
The next question to be examined is that of ’localized spillovers’. The
authors test that hypothesis by adding a regional FDI coefficient to their
model. Once more they find little evidence of spillovers from local FDI. Vari-
ation of parameters would not change the result. Even when stretching time
periods for spillovers to up to eight years, spillovers remain non-existent.
Still, long-run effects might not have been captured due to lags in time.
Also, Venezuela might not have been the best place to look for spillovers
from FDI. Aitken and Harrison reckon that results might be different in
more export-oriented economies.
4.3 What can be learned of the empirical research?
After reviewing the literature on spillovers, the first thing to note is that it
has proved to be very difficult to measure spillovers. This might not come
unexpected. Spillovers are hard to trace, and difficult to isolate from other
effects. Further, the statistical methods influenced the results. Goerg and
Strobl (2001) find that results depend on the kind of data used. What is
clear, however, is the highlighted role of spillovers found in nearly all the
research designs.
Only Blomstro¨m and Kokko (1998) turn to the role of linkages between
MNEs and local firms. Backward linkages are important in that MNEs help
their suppliers to reach a certain level of product quality. MNEs can provide
training and help, give advise on marketing and use their international con-
nections to find buyers/suppliers, for instance. However, Blomstro¨m and
Kokko cannot come up with an empirical study to support their claims,
basing them on different papers instead. It is surprising that the empirical
literature on linkages is very slim, given that the term is en vogue.
Throughout all conducted studies foreign firms paid higher wages than
firms of the host country. Wages in the MNE’s subsidiaries are up to 50%
higher than in local firms18. This holds for developing countries as well
as developed countries. The reason of that is still unclear. Lipsey (2002)
reckons that MNEs are interested in attracting the best workers and pay
a skill-premium. Another finding is the higher productivity level of foreign
firms. This goes for TFP as well as labor productivity. Lipsey (2002) finds
that the competitive advantage of foreign firms stems from their larger size
and, at times, their greater use of purchased inputs. Baldwin, Braconier
18Lipsey (2002)
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and Forslid (2001) went on to conclude that a higher FDI penetration level
leads to more rapid growth in that industry.
No new insights have been derived from the technology gap discussion.
Sjo¨holm (1999) found that the higher the technology gap is, the higher
spillovers are. This could be translated into: The more one lags behind,
the more room there is for catch-up. On the other hand, the existence of
extremely large technology gaps could prohibit spillovers. The gap would be
too big to close. A large technology gap is the result of under-development
in the past. A technology gap can then be understood as the outcome of a
set of factors, like a lack of infrastructure, an ill-educated work force, and
so on.
Barrell and Pain (1999) find that an MNE’s decision on the location of
FDI - and therefore the cost of introducing a new technology - depends on
skills and knowledge of the local labor force, among other things (mainly the
scope of benefits from agglomeration economies). It would now be difficult
to think of a reason why a MNE should invest in that economy and bring
some advanced technology with it. The existence of a technology gap is
caused by under-development. As far as I see it, there does not seem to
be a difference between the concepts of ’underdevelopment’ and ’technology
gap’.
Summing this section up, the recent empirical literature on technological
spillovers does not establish a clear link between FDI inflows and produc-
tivity of local firms. Spillovers that flow from MNEs to local firms and
raise their productivity have not been proved to exist. The research design
has often been like this: if industries with a large foreign share grow faster
than the mostly domestic industries, the existence of spillovers would be
confirmed. The authors of the literature focus on technological spillovers,
while mostly ignoring the concept of linkages. This problem is rooted in the
growth theory: spillovers are always understood as knowledge spillovers.
Knowledge is a public good, and externalities arise between firms.
The assumption of knowledge being a global public good is a strong
one. Often, knowledge is protected by copyright laws, trademarks and other
intellectual property rights. A fair amount of knowledge is embodied in
machinery, which cannot be assumed to spill over easily. Skills necessary to
make good use of technology have to be acquired. Then, the actual process
of innovation is very complicated - as it involves social interactions - and
is not likely to be explained well by a couple of equations19. For instance,
the existence of knowledge is not enough to produce an innovation. What
is necessary is an economic motive for innovation. Thus, MNEs looking
for a way to enter new markets or serve existing markets from a cheaper
basis might act as a catalyst. When they demand better product quality
from their local suppliers, they deliver a reason to innovate. This might be
19von Hayek (1945)
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what Hirschman had hoped for, and that is also why many governments in
developing countries are trying to attract MNEs.
The focus of growth theory on knowledge is too tight. While knowledge
surely is important, knowledge alone is not sufficient for economic growth.
To innovate successfully there needs to be an economic motive, like be-
ing a monopolist. Market structure influences innovation20. The empirical
literature on spillovers from FDI reviewed above claims that competition
spillovers are influencing the growth rates of local firms. This essential issue
cannot be modeled by growth theory. The aggregated view, while assur-
ing solvable models, blinds the theory with respect to technological change
through MNEs.
5 Next, please: New Economic Geography
The fast-growing literature on NEG has already produced some elaborate
models including MNEs and FDI. Coming from a different direction than
the empirically motivated literature, it is considered necessary to explain
the basic workings of the core-periphery (CP) model and to clarify the vo-
cabulary. After that we will take a look at different types of models. One
model features spillovers and growth, the other includes endogenous MNEs.
The aim of this section is to establish a link between the NEG theory and
the empirical literature on spillovers from FDI.
5.1 The core-periphery model
The core-periphery model is the standard NEG model. It includes all the
main features and will be discussed shortly21. The CP model is constructed
from a mix of ingredients. There is a spatial concept dating back to von
Thu¨nen (1826) which allows for multiple regions in space. Transport costs
arise when anyone sells a product in a distant region. These transport costs
are modeled as iceberg costs. A certain amount of the good ’melts away’ on
the way to its destination. The farther a product is transported, the higher
are the absolute ’costs’ of transport. In the end, to deliver one unit to a
distant location the firm has to send more then one unit, depending on the
distance. Someone once thought of iceberg costs as a horse pulling a wagon
of grain to a distant market, thereby consuming part of the grain on his
way22.
The CP model features two sectors, manufacturing and agriculture.
There are two corresponding factors: workers in manufactures and agri-
cultural workers, both located in two symmetric regions. The products of
20The discussion of cheaper drugs for Africa is an example. Health companies claim
that resulting diminishing profits would in return lower the incentives to innovate.
21For an extensive discussion, see Brakman et al. (2001)
22See von Thu¨nen (1826), Chapter 4
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the manufacturing sector compete with each other in a Dixit-Stiglitz mo-
nopolistic competition framework. Consequently, firms diverge only in the
variety they produce. The agricultural goods are transported costlessly and
sold in a perfectly competitive market23. Returns are constant and prod-
ucts homogeneous. Workers in both sectors seek to maximize their utility,
which consists of the consumption of manufactures and agriculture. These
are bought on the local market. The real wage depends on the nominal
wage and the local price index. Workers spend their income locally and are
mobile, moving to the region that offers the highest real wage.
Three forces exist that shape the effects of agglomeration. The home
market effect is a self-reinforcing agglomeration force. It manifests itself
through worker migration and their impact on markets. We assume a sym-
metric equilibrium in which one worker moves from south to north. Then it
gets more expensive for Southern firms to reach this consumer in the north.
There is an incentive to follow him and minimize transport costs. Put in
another way, the arrival of a new worker/firm in the north enlarges the local
market and makes it more attractive.
The home market effect depends on transport costs (the higher they are,
the stronger the effect) and fixed costs in production (again: the higher they
are, the stronger the effect). The home market effect is often considered to
be a ’backward linkage’24. But does this fit well with Hirschman’s original
concept of linkages? Obviously, in the NEG model the producers benefit
from lower transport costs since the market has moved closer to their loca-
tion. On the other hand the market effect is a cumulative effect, because it
also lowers the consumers’ price index.
Since consumers and producers are identical, it is a little bit tricky to
decide if this is a linkage. According to Hirschman, linkages exist between
firms or industries. Here, firms benefit from consumers moving to their
direction so they can save on transport costs. Strictly speaking, this is not a
backward linkage, although consumers and firms are identical in the model.
Still, the home market effect is based on a magnification effect that exists
because consumers cluster together to form a big market.
Coming back to our example of a worker migrating from south to north,
there is a second effect on the local price index. The worker brings with
him a variety that had to be transported from the south before. It is locally
available cheaper than before and lowers the local price index. This would
be a forward linkage, were not consumers instead of firms to benefit from
it. In the scenario this implies a rise in real wages in the north, while in
the south real wages fall correspondingly. With real wages rising in the
north and falling in the south, more workers will be inclined to migrate to
the north. Venables (1996) developed a model where firms use other firms
23Without transport costs, there is only one integrated ’world’ market
24See Robert-Nicoud (2002), p. 9
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outputs as inputs, thereby generating a model with forward linkages a` la
Hirschman.
The third effect is pushing in the opposite direction. It is called ’mar-
ket crowding’ or ’local competition’ effect. More firms translate directly
into more competition. That is a result of the love for variety: Because con-
sumers value variety, each new product cuts into the markets of all the other
products. This lowers profits and ultimately translates into lower wages (and
less firms). The location is loosing attractiveness in terms of real wages25.
There is a tension between locating a firm in the neighborhood of the com-
petitors to form a large market, and locating far from each other to soften
competition. This is maybe ’the’ essential trade-off of the CP-model26.
Fig. 2: The CP model, medium trade costs27
Because both agglomeration effects are self-reinforcing, the model’s equi-
libria need to be checked for stability. The equilibrium is considered stable
only if there is no incentive for any worker to switch to the other region
(and enjoy a higher real wage there). If the relocation of one worker would
25The extent of the effect depends crucially on the degree of consumer’s love for variety.
Because consumers value variety, the price index sinks with every new variety. This may
overcompensate the loss in nominal wages and therefore lead to more agglomeration.
26The footloose capital model by Martin and Rogers (1995) was adapted by Baldwin
et al. (2003). Although much simpler analytically than the CP model, it shows quite the
same characteristics.
27Graph taken from a lecture by Wooton (2001), with permission
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improve his real wage, it will often be followed by what is called circular cau-
sation: After the worker has relocated, changes in real wages induce more
workers to follow. Accordingly, in Figure 2 there are three stable equilibria:
the symmetric outcome, where L1 = L2, and the core-periphery outcomes,
where L1 = 0 and L2 = 0. The equilibria to the left and to the right are
unstable.
When we take the left equilibrium, for instance, we see that a worker
defecting to region 1 (we move to the right) raises the relative wage in region
1 (ω1>ω2). This will lead to even more workers switching regions until we
are at the symmetric equilibrium. At this point any incentives to relocate
have ceased. A worker relocating from region 2 to region 1 (we move even
farther to the right) will find that after his move is completed, real wage
in region 2 is lower than that in region 1. Would we have started with a
worker relocating to region 2 instead of region 1, the result would have been
a different story. To the left of the left equilibrium the real wage of region 2
is higher than that of region 1. A cumulative process sets in, but this time
it goes in the other direction and leads to complete agglomeration! There is
a fair amount of fuzzy math in the dynamics of the CP model 28.
5.2 A model with endogenous MNEs
Ekholm and Forslid (1999) extend the CP model by adding MNEs. They find
that the core-periphery structure is an outcome of restrictive assumptions.
The most significant, Ekholm and Forslid argue, are that MNEs can locate
only in one location and that economies of scale exist on a plant level only.
In reality firms would realize economies of scale on a firm-level which would
then prompt them to operate in more than one region. Two types of multi-
region firms would then have to be examined: Horizontal MNEs and vertical
MNEs.
Horizontal MNEs are driven by a tension between the costs of an ad-
ditional plant and the costs of trade. If both of these costs are relatively
high, there will be only single-region firms. Only if the setup costs are low
enough, a firm will choose to become multinational to save transport costs.
The main finding in this model is that in symmetric equilibrium there is no
trade. Producing in both regions means that a firm can adjust output to
changes in factor prices and demand in either of the locations29. The entry
of single-region firms is not possible due to the MNEs competitive advan-
tage. The competitive advantage stems from the fact that two plants share
the costs of the headquarter, which produces under economies of scale.
Vertical MNEs are different in that they consist of one or more plants
and exactly one headquarter. Now variable production costs arise only at
28Maybe that is why it looks so realistic.
29No factor movement is required: a rise in demand stems from the relocation of con-
sumers, which are at the same time making available their labor in that region.
16
the plant, while fixed costs take the form of headquarter services. These may
include back-office facilities, management, marketing, and R&D. A vertical
MNE would have its headquarters in the low-wage region, since services
are freely tradable. Its plant would then be located in the other region,
since otherwise it would not be a MNE. Two effects arise from a model with
vertical MNEs: First, the symmetric equilibrium is destabilized at high trade
costs, since firms tend to locate their headquarters in the region with the
lower wage. Second, the tendency of the model to produce a core-periphery
outcome is reduced. It is now less costly for firms to move their plant to
the smaller region, because the fixed costs for headquarter services do not
change.
A problem arises with the resulting equilibria: Domestic and foreign
firms do never coexist. Either there are domestic firms (and multinationals)
or foreign firms (and multinationals). At times, the regime of country A
switches from foreign firms to domestic firms. This would have catastrophic
results in region B. The number of firms would sink dramatically, then price
indexes and nominal wages would follow. Serious repercussions could be
expected in A, but the link is cut off in the model.
5.3 A model with endogenous growth
The first NEG models featuring spillovers and endogenous growth came
from Martin and Ottaviano (1998) and Baldwin, Martin, Ottaviano (2001).
While the first paper contains global spillovers, the later work assumes that
spillovers are localized. The main idea is the introduction of an innovation
sector30, where labor is transformed into capital. Capital is then used as
the only factor to cover fixed costs of the manufacturing sector. New capi-
tal increases the number of varieties, thus lowering revenue for all existing
firms due to the Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition framework. Due
to Learning-by-doing the cost of innovation decreases in time. Going into
details here would be interesting, but that certainly lies beyond the scope
of this paper. As a compromise, the logic of the model will be outlined in
the following passage.
Baldwin, Martin, and Ottaviano (hereafter BMO) consider a standard
NEG model which features a third capital-constructing I-sector. This sec-
tor produces capital, which is needed for production of the manufactures
sector. In the I-sector, one unit of capital is needed to cover fixed costs,
while marginal costs are covered by labor. In this model, units of capital
equal regional capital stocks, I-sector production and number of varieties.
Capital is depreciating over time. The spatial effect of knowledge spillovers
is expressed through λ , which can take a value between ’local spillovers’ and
’knowledge as a public good’. These spillovers cause an inter-temporal ver-
30This is a standard feature in many endogenous growth models
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tical linkage, because workers benefit from the location of past production.
Being more productive, they make innovation more attractive in their re-
gion. At that point the circular causality is completed. This is described in
the literature as the emergence of growth poles and sinks. While the region
in the growth sink stagnates, the growth pole attracts all new varieties.
An interesting result that is derived from the BMO model is that geog-
raphy affects growth. When trade costs are high, the regions are integrated
neither in industry nor in innovation. As the break point is reached, a CP
outcome arises. When innovation is located in a single region, local spillovers
in that sector raise productivity. The equilibrium growth path is rising with
it so that in the end economic integration has a positive influence on growth.
The benefits of stronger growth are different in the regions. The core region
definitely enjoys a rise in welfare, while the results for the periphery region
are not so straightforward. Much depends on µ , the expenditures share of
manufacturing goods. The higher µ is in the periphery region, the more do
its people profit from a lower price of manufactures. Therefore a sufficiently
high enough µ can lift the periphery’s welfare over its pre-CP level. Here,
both regions gain from a CP outcome31.
6 Perfect Match?
Now that some NEGmodels have been characterized, they will be confronted
with the empirical results of section 4. Hopefully, the results of the empirical
literature are to some extent reflected in the NEG models. As theory and
reality are put side by side, the existing models will be evaluated.
6.1 The CP model
The basic CP model and the empirical spillover literature do not mix very
well. The main issue is that FDI is modeled through migration of workers.
This is highly unrealistic in an international context and can thus only be
understood as a metaphor. International labor mobility is low, and it does
not seem to change soon - not even in the European Union 32. If labor
migration is a metaphor for shifts in demand, then it can be questioned if
it is modeled well. Why should such a shift in demand start a cumulative
process? Is there a reason why a shift in demand can only be modeled by a
simultaneously shift in supply33?
What the CP model basically does say about FDI looks utterly pes-
simistic: If we have symmetric regions, inequality will arise when transport
31For a more detailed description of the model’s workings see Chapter 7 ’Global and
Local Spillover Models’ in Baldwin, Forslid, Martin, Ottaviano and Robert-Nicoud (2003)
32Puhani (1999)
33This is due to the fact that each worker represents a firm. That way demand and
supply always ’go together’.
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costs go down. The first region to attract an additional worker will come
out to be the core region. During the restructuring process, there will be
one-way FDI flows into that region. That would be the interpretation of
the migration of workers, fleeing the sinking ship of the periphery region,
attracted by higher real wages in the core region. The mechanism does not
fit well with empirical results in general. For instance, empirical findings
tell us that similar regions feature relatively large FDI flows between them
(take France and Germany, for instance). The FDI flows in the CP model’s
symmetric equilibrium are exactly zero34.
Also, differences in technology are difficult to model because the mo-
nopolistic competition setup does not easily allow for different techniques35.
Differences in technology are an important issue for FDI-related decisions.
Productivity to a certain extent depends on technology. Differences in firm
technology would also allow for an equilibrium with domestic and foreign
firms. If technologies are identical, then between domestic or foreign firms
there will be one cheaper alternative. In the end, all firms will choose to be
of that kind. Since there is only one input factor, this problem will persist.
6.2 The MNE model
Ekholm and Forslid (1999) tried to shed light on the role of MNEs in a CP
model. They introduce horizontal and vertical MNEs. Horizontal MNEs face
the task of minimizing transport costs, choosing to export from their home
plant or to build a second plant in the foreign economy. The choice here is
made to minimize costs. Vertical MNEs can choose different locations for
headquarter and plant. Headquarter services are traded freely in the firm,
therefore they will be produced wherever nominal wages are lowest. There
is a cost of splitting headquarters from the plant.
While the CP model was not build to feature FDI and its examination
with respect to it could have been a little unfair, the model of Ekholm and
Forslid features FDI explicitly. The construction of a plant in a foreign
country is nothing but FDI, although the authors did not emphasize it.
Maybe they avoided that vocabulary because the model is not well suited to
discuss FDI. However, the theme of cost-cutting MNEs fits very well with
the assumed role of MNEs in technology transfer.
Nevertheless, the CP model’s weaknesses are not erased. Still, labor is
the mechanism through which FDI ’works’. Fixed costs of a second plant
are ’worked out’ in labor units. A firm that economizes on transport costs
by relocating its plant to the foreign region moves its workers there. This is
34In equilibrium wages are equalized, therefore worker migration - which equals FDI in
this case - has ceased.
35We already have one degree of freedom in the CP model, which makes finding solutions
very difficult. Adding firms that realize a point from a technology function will make work
harder still.
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modeled as a short term decision. The fixed costs are paid for by the end
of the period, then the firm chooses locations again! This does not fit well
with empirical results, which rank FDI as a long-term decision that is only
reversed with a huge monetary loss.
Also, the modeling of headquarter services seems a little bit awkward.
Firms can place their headquarters freely, because its services are traded
freely within the firm. The authors then assume that the headquarter goes
to the region with the lowest nominal wages. If this overcompensates the
splitting costs, headquarter and plant will be separated. The question here
is: Why should headquarter jobs go to the region with the lowest nominal
wages? This breaks with the structure of the rest of the model. Workers
are always attracted by high (real) wages, they form big markets that firms
themselves are attracted to. Why should firms think that they could offer
workers low-paid jobs?
Despite those shortcomings the Ekholm/Forslid model seems to be better
equipped to model international growth processes. MNEs arise and with
them FDI is brought into the setup. For horizontal MNEs, the construction
of a second plant in a foreign region would be a FDI flow. Spillovers arise
from the influence of the MNE on existing linkages. This looks just like the
scenario from the empirical search for spillovers from FDI.
6.3 The endogenous growth model
The endogenous growth model by Baldwin, Martin and Ottaviano (here-
after BMO) is a modification of the CP model. The mobile factor is not
labor, but capital. This is definitely a better choice to model FDI. Capi-
tal flows arise endogenously, resulting from actors optimizing their income
over time. Contrary to that Lipsey (2002) denies the nature of FDI being
capital movement: FDI would be about ownership, not location. Skills and
knowledge would be the content of FDI rather than capital. The character
of capital flows in the BMO model might be more of a portfolio investment-
type than of a typical FDI-type. Another difference from the CP model is
that, because cost and demand linkages are cut, all self-reinforcing effects
are gone. However, linkages were found to be important spillover channels.
Also, empirical studies proved the importance of a big markets36.
The BMO model itself seems to work very well, and most of its results
seem reasonable. The question of symmetry or CP outcome depends on
the localization of spillovers. If knowledge is not a public good but a local
spillover, the innovative sector will end up in one region. The core will
attract more firms because of the market effect, so a CP outcome is quite
likely. The empirical literature affirmatively finds that spillovers are local37.
The BMO model seems to use a compatible concept regarding spillovers.
36See Davis and Weinstein (2003)
37See Audretsch (2003)
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What is also interesting is the emergence of growth sinks and growth
poles. Lagging regions seem to stall for a long time, while the advanced
region keeps on growing constantly. This is a prediction that was exam-
ined empirically. Fischer (2003) found that in the last 20 years develop-
ing countries outgrew industrialized countries, if one focuses on population
and not countries. However, there is not much empirical support for the
BMO model’s prediction that capital flows from the periphery region sus-
tain growth in the advanced region.
7 Conclusion
After reviewing growth theory and NEG models in the previous sections, it
seems that NEG models are better equipped to feature interactions of MNEs
and local firms. MNEs and market structure can be modeled explicitly,
as well as spillovers or linkages. These seem to be the main ingredients
when modeling technology transfer through MNEs. Supporting this view,
the empirical literature found the role of MNEs in technology transfer to
be important38. The growth theory with its aggregated views of firms and
markets is not able to incorporate these ingredients. Empirical studies based
on a growth theory framework did not confirm its predictions. This may be
due to a flawed research design, so that it does not necessarily mean that
local firms do not benefit from arriving MNEs.
The NEG suggests a different approach. The role of linkages is empha-
sized, market access and transport costs play an important part in economic
integration. MNEs can be modeled explicitly. The behavior of MNEs in the
model of Ekholm and Forslid could be a starting point from which to de-
velop a more comprehensive model of MNEs in a globalization-scenario NEG
model. It could turn out to be an improvement if a vertical structure is ex-
pressed through firms in a vertical production network39 instead of firms
splitting themselves up. That assumption is somewhat unrealistic, as recent
relocations of outsourced headquarter services, like accounting, from devel-
oped countries to developing countries tend to show.40 It might be a good
idea to extend the model by a capital good that embodies technology. That
way, the transfer of technology and its spillovers can be modeled explicitly.
This leads us to another problem. In the NEG models all firms use the
same technology. Therefore it is not possible to let domestic and multina-
tional firms co-exist. A model with different technologies might bring relief.
When firms are allowed to choose between different technologies, some of
them might want to go multinational while others prefer to stay domestic.
38See Keller (2001)
39See Venables (1996) might make a good point to start from.
40See ”The great hollowing-out myth”, Economist Feb 21th: p. 41-43
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Decisions could resemble the OLI-Paradigm41 in that firms choose to export
or move to the other region (FDI), depending on questions of ownership.
A workhorse for incorporating capital goods might be the BMO model
featuring endogenous growth. It is suited very well to incorporate capital
flows like FDI. Modeling FDI through labor migration, even if it is taken
metaphoric, might lead to dangerous misunderstandings about trade. The
biggest drawback is that labor migration always creates a looser and a win-
ner. The core region has a higher real wage and usually it is very unlikely
that it will break up again. Also, labor migration across national borders is
a phenomenon not to be expected on a large scale.
It seems unlikely that one model can explain the whole world (trade)
satisfactionally. Some assumptions have to be made, and then modeling a
NEG framework with MNEs and technological spillovers may turn out to be
like chasing a mole: of all the mole-hills, one can cover only two at a time.
Still, it should be worth to consider which holes there are and where to look
for new insights.
41Dunning (1977)
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